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How trading arrangements within the foreign exchange market might affect
the behavior of prices and allocative efficiency is largely unexplored territory.
In a recent survey article, Flood (1991) stresses how little is known about basic
features of the foreign exchange market. For example, why is the magnitude
of interdealer trading (80 percent of total volume) so great? Why is half of that
trading intermediated by brokers?
Of the few studies of foreign exchange market institutional arrangements,
Grossman and Zhou (1991) study the effect of stop-loss trading rules typically
used by foreign exchange dealers on optimal portfolio strategies of individual
traders. Krugman and Miller (1993) adduce various consequences of such
rules for the behavior of the foreign exchange market as a whole, arguing that
they may provoke market crashes, which could in turn provide a justification
for commonly observed intervention behavior by central banks like target
zones. Bossaerts and Hillion (1991) examine the implications of dealer behav-
ior for unbiasedness tests in foreign exchange markets.
Finally, an interesting series of papers by Lyons (1992, 1993, 1995) directly
analyzes the microstructure of the foreign exchange market. Lyons concen-
trates particularly on the role of brokers, viewing them as a means by which
order flow information is aggregated and then disseminated among dealers.
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While this is certainly a fruitful line of research, it is not clear in such models
why individual dealers do not have an incentive to deal directly rather than
through brokers. Also, conversations with traders suggested to us that brokers
are primarily important because of the efficient access that they provide to
large numbers of other market participants.
For these reasons, the analysis of foreign exchange trading that we attempt
in this paper has a somewhat different focus from that of Lyons. We concen-
trate on the consequences for efficiency and exchange rate behavior of the mar-
ket's decentralized nature, that is, the fact that dealers are ignorant of the order
flow of other marketmakers. Interbank trading is modeled as a means by which
marketmakers "sell" each other information about their transactions with out-
side customers. We show that, under these assumptions, decentralized market
arrangements are privately efficient for the group of marketmakers.
The reason that a decentralized market works well in this case is that it
allows marketmakers to capture, through interdealer trade, the informational
rents associated with receiving outside orders and hence gives them an incen-
tive to adjust their spreads optimally to maximize those rents. If marketmakers
are able to transact with only a fraction of other dealers between customer
orders, a centralized market in which order flow information is freely and in-
stantaneously available may be preferable to decentralized arrangements. Al-
though incentives to adjust bid-ask spreads efficiently are diluted in a central-
ized market, at least dealers can observe customer orders and rationally update
their subjective probabilities.
An important aspect of the relative efficiency of different market arrange-
ments is their robustness to extreme informational asymmetries. Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) discuss the market crashes that may occur when dealers sus-
pect that large numbers of informed agents are present. During such crashes,
volume dries up as spreads widen and the informativeness of prices is lost.
One of our more interesting findings is that such crashes happen much less in
decentralized than in centralized markets such as those studied by Glosten and
Milgrom (1985). The reason is that dealers have an incentive to maintain at
least some turnover in order to elicit information that they can us in future
trading.
As well as supplying results, our analysis sheds light on the implications
of decentralized markets for the time-series behavior of exchange rates. Most
notably, we find, first, that the usual martingale properties of prices are absent,
in that, in the decentralized market, the bid and ask on average increase and
decline, respectively, as trades reveal information. Second, the unconditional
variance of changes in bid and ask quotes is greater in the decentralized than
in the centralized market. We also prove a series of comparative static results,
demonstrating that, as one might expect, in the decentralized market spreads
widen as the proportion of informed traders increases, while the bid price is
increasing in the probability of higher exchange rate values.75 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
Previous theoretical work on decentralized markets has been quite limited,
although recently several authors have begun to address the issue. Biais (1993)
studies the effects of deviations from transparency in an inventory model of
microstructure. Our approach, concentrating as it does on informational asym-
metries, may be viewed as complimentary to Biais's work. An interesting re-
cent paper by Neuberger, Naik, and Viswananthan (1993) examines the effect
of trade publication delays on price formation in the London Stock Exchange.
Although their modeling approach is quite different from ours,
1 they empha-
size as we do the informativeness of customer trades.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In section 3.1, we set out the model,
studying first a static model of dealing with informed and uninformed outside
customers and then showing how this fits into a more complicated dynamic
framework with two periods of customer trading separated by a period of in-
terbank transactions. Section 3.2 describes the results that we obtain with the
model. These include results on efficiency, statistics of bid and ask prices, com-
parative statics for dealer prices and informational rents, and a result on inter-
dealer market volume. An appendix provides a complete account of the proofs
of the various lemmas and propositions.
3.1 The Model
3.1.1 B asic Assumptions
Suppose that there are n identical dealers and four periods, denoted 0, 1,2,
3. In period 0, each dealer selects a bid and ask and then trades with a customer
if one presents himself. In period 1, dealers may trade among themselves if
they so wish. In period 2, dealers trade again with customers if there are any.
In period 3, all uncertainty is resolved.
Assume for simplicity that all agents are risk neutral and that the interest
rate is zero.
2 The structure of trading and of the stochastic order flow from
customers is as follows (for a summary, see figure 3.1). The value of the ex-
change rate in period 3 is the realization of a random variable, z. Let the uncon-
ditional distribution of z be binomial in that z takes the values 1 and — 1 with
probabilities q and (1 — q).
In period 0, a single customer arrives and is allocated with probability \/n
to a given dealer. With probabilities a and 1 — a, respectively, the trader is
either informed or a liquidity trader. Informed traders transact if and only if
their observation of the true value, z, exceeds the ask quoted by the dealer, sA
1. Their model has a batch trading structure with a single price rather than a bid-ask spread, and
risk pooling plays an important role.
2. The latter is simply a normalization as we could value assets relative to the value of a safe









Up-date q. If t < 2 inter-bank trade
and go to START. Else stop.
Fig. 3.1 Stochastic order flow structure
(in which case they buy), or falls below the bid price, sB (in which case they
sell). We suppose that liquidity traders buy, sell, or do not trade with probabili-
ties (1 - sA)/2, (sB + l)/2, and (sA - sB)l2.
Note that in our model the price sensitivity of liquidity trader orders receives
more stress than it does in much of the market microstructure literature. The
dealers in our formulation set their spread in order to exploit their monopoly
power over part of the uninformed order flow. In stressing this aspect, our study
resembles the important early paper by Copeland and Galai (1983).
In period 1, dealers may trade among themselves in such a way as to convey
information about the customer order received in period 0. In period 2, each
dealer again receives a customer order with probability \ln that once more77 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
originates with an informed or an uninformed trader with probabilities a and
1 — a. Finally, we adopt the following definition:
Definition 1. A centralized market is one in which information on dealers'
order flow is freely and instantly available to other dealers. A decentralized
market is one in which this is not the case.
The above structure of orders implies that our model is applicable to an ex-
tremely short period of time. To be specific, we analyze interdealer transac-
tions that can occur in the moments between two substantial and possibly in-
formative customer trades. Perhaps the best way to think of the model is as a
description of the situation faced by dealers immediately following some event
affecting the foreign exchange market.
3.1.2 The Static Problem
Before considering the more complicated dynamic problem of the dealers
described above, let us study the static problem of a dealer who has a single
opportunity to trade with informed and uninformed customers. Again assume
that informed traders arrive with probability a, and suppose that q is the deal-
er's current conditional probability for the event {z — 1}.
The intuition for some of the more important points that emerge from our
analysis may be understood even within this simple framework. It is also im-
portant to understand the structure of the static problem since this is what deal-
ers face in period 2 even when they have a fully dynamic problem to solve in
period 0.
The dealer's static value function Yl(sA, sB) may be written as
where
(2) UA(sA) = (1 - a) ° ~
 SA) (SA - E(z)) + aE{(sA - z)\{z = 1}}
= (1 - a) —^ (sA ~ (2q - 1)) + aq(sA - 1),
(3) UB(sB) - (1 - a) ^~Y^ (E(z) - sB) + aE{(z - sB)\{z = -1}}
= (1 - a)
 (l±hl ({2q - i) - SB) - a(i
where we use the fact that E(z\q) = 2q — 1. The static value function is qua-
dratic in the quotes, sA and sB. Maximizing this function with respect to sA and
sB yields the maximizing arguments
(4) si = mini—?—, 1 i, 4 = max]-- , ~ 1 [•
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Fig. 3.2 Static value maximization
The min and max operators in equation (4) appear because the maximum of
the unconstrained value function may lie outside the interval [—1, 1]. In this
case, the situation is as depicted in figure 3.2b, c. This feature of the model
will generate subcases for the various propositions that we develop below.
In the absence of asymmetric information, that is, when a = 0, the optimal
static quotes, sA and s*B, equal q and q — 1 respectively. In this case, the dealer's
calculation is motivated solely by the desire to exploit optimally the
downward-sloping demand curve for liquidity trader orders that he faces. For
a > 0, the absolute magnitude of the optimal quotes for a static dealer in-
creases as he is now obliged to protect himself against informed trades by
widening his spread.
Substituting for s* = sA(q) and s*B = sB(q) in (2) and (3), we obtain that, for
a < 1/2,
(5) U(sA(q), sB(q)) =
f((l - a) - qfl(2 - 2a)
I (2q(q - 1) + a




if 0 < q < a,
if a ^ q ^ (1 — a),
if (1 - a) <q< 1.
One may note that II is quadratic and continuous in q and that it has an interior
minimum at q = 111. The form of II, which will be important for our results
below, is shown in figure 3.3a.
3.1.3 Filtering
Suppose now that the dealer trades in more than one period. In this case, he
may be able to use the information that he has gained from period 0 trades.
The information is potentially valuable, first, because, in his own period 2 trad-
ing, it may permit him to quote a bid-ask spread that yields higher expected
profits. Second, he may be able to "sell" the information to other dealers in
that they may be willing to trade with him at advantageous terms in the in-
terbank market in order to learn about his order flow.
Suppose that dealers use Bayes's rule to update their probability assess-79 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
A B
Fig. 3.3 Static profits and binomial probabilities
merits. In this case, the conditional probability of the even {z = 1} following
a buy order at 0, qh, will be
(6) qb = Prob[z = l|buy]
Prob[z = 1 and buy] _ aq + (1 - a)q(l - sm)l2
Prob[buy] aq - sA0)/2
The updated probability for {z = 1} following a sell, qs, may be similarly
derived as
(7) qs = Prob[z =
sm)l2
sB0)/2
The important point to note about the updated probabilities is that they depend
on the bid and ask quotes in the first period, sB0 and sA0. This dependency means
that the dealer's choice of period 0 quotes will be influenced by the effect of
order flow information on period 2 profits. Since order flow information may
be valuable to other dealers, the possibility of "selling" this information
through trading in the interbank market will also affect the dealer's optimal
choice of period 0 quotes.
In standard, dynamic microstructure models such as those of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) or Easley and O'Hara (1987), this particular link between
trading in different periods is broken by the fact that order flow information is
assumed to be public knowledge.
3.1.4 Information Rents
Consider a dealer who has received no orders in period 0. If he trades again
with outside customers in period 2 without receiving any information about80 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
other dealers' trades, his expected profits will be H(q). On the other hand, if
he can buy information from another dealer who has received, for example, a
buy order, his expected profits will be H(qb).
The total increase in his expected profits when he learns of a buy order,
H(qb) — Yl(q), may be decomposed into a news effect and a "feedback rent."
Let U[sA(q), sB(q)\qb] be the expected profits that the dealer obtains under up-
dated probabilities, qb, but under the assumption that he sets sA and sB as if the
probability of {z = 1} were q. Now, one may write
(8) U(qb) - U(q) = (U(qb) - U(sA(q), sB{q)\qb))
+ (U(sA(q), sB{q)\qb) ~
The first bracketed term on the right-hand side is the expected value to the
dealer of being able to adjust his quotes in response to the information. We
refer to this extra value as the feedback rent.
3 This represents the increase in
expected profits that the dealer can achieve by using the information to select
his period 2 bid and ask quotes more efficiently. The second bracketed term in
(8) is the pure news value of the information, that is, the change in the dealer's
expected profits in a case in which he were, for some reason, unable to adjust
his period 2 quotes. A similar decomposition can, of course, be performed for
the change in expected profits due to information on a sale.
As mentioned above, our formulation of the interdealer market will entail
informed dealers passing information to each other through their period 1
trades. The surplus over which they may be expected to bargain will then be
the feedback rent, U(qb) - U(sA(q), sB{q)\qb). Note that, even if Yi{qb) - Ii{q) is negative, dealers will be willing to pay each other for the information so
long as the feedback rent is positive. This is analogous to the willingness of
someone to pay for news that he is going to die so as long as the knowledge
will allow him to take actions that prolong his life at least a little. Now, in our
case, the feedback rent, Tl{qb) — Yl(sA(q), sB(q)\qb), is nonnegative, as one may
see from the fact that H(qb) = maxq€[Ol]{U(sA(q), sB(q)\qb)}. Hence, dealers will always be willing to pay for information.
We shall suppose the following:
Assumption 1. Feedback rent associated with information on a customer
trade is captured by the dealer who performs the trade.
This assumption has the merit of substantially simplifying the analysis. Al-
though it represents a polar case, we think it unlikely that our results would be
substantially affected if a more even division of feedback rents were allowed
for.
3. As in any dynamic programming problem under uncertainty, the dealer will do better if he
can employ "feedback" controls that adjust according to information received.81 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
3.1.5 The Dynamic Model
Suppose that a dealer who receives an order in period 0 is able to transact
with a fraction, k, of other marketmakers in period 1. We think it reasonable to
assume that k is closer to unity than zero. A substantial marketmaking opera-
tion with a sufficiently large dealing personnel can arrange simultaneous trades
with fifteen to twenty other dealers. The number of international banks that
trade in substantial size does not greatly exceed this figure.
Let P(A) = [aq + (1 - a)(l - sA0)/2] and P(B) = [a(l - q) + (1 - a)
(1 + sBQ)/2] denote the probabilities, respectively, of receiving an order at the
ask or the bid in period 0. The period 0 value function for the dynamically
optimizing dealer is
(9)
+ P(A) f- U2(sA0) +
 ki^L^l rent(5 f- U2 In
+ P(fi) f-n2(5so) +
 k(H "
 l) rental + (1 - P(A) - P(B)) - U2(sA2, sB2)}
in n J n \
^ ^ ^), sB(q)\qb) + Prob(B)U(sA(q), sB(q)\qs)
+ (1 - P(A) - ?(B))U(sA2, sB2)},
where sA2 and sB2 are the optimal static, uninformed ask and bid quotes given
in equation (4).
When dealers can trade with all other dealers in period 1, the dynamic value
function simplifies to
(10) V0(sA0, sB0) = i {U0(sAO) + U0(sB0) + P(A)II2(sA0) + P(B)U2(sB0) + (1 - P(A) - ?(B))U2(sA2, sB2)}.
Since all dealers are the same, by the symmetry of the problem, each dealer's
value function equals \ln times the expected value of the total market order
flow. When k = 1, this is the above, simple, bracketed expression.
It is possible to obtain analytic solutions for the ask and bid quotes that
maximize this value function since the first-order conditions turn out to be
cubic functions of the prices.
4 In fact, the complexity of the resulting expres-
sions means that they are not of much practical use. However, as we show in
the results section below, one can learn a considerable amount by analyzing
the first-order conditions and examining properties of the period 2 problem
than by solving directly for bid and ask prices.
4. Although complicated, closed-form solutions to cubic equations are available (see Abramov-
itz and Stegun 1964).82 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Information and Expected Profits
In this section, we establish two propositions on the value of information in
our model. We start with the following:
Proposition 1. The following three statements are equivalent:
1. News of a buy order increases total expected profits in period 2.
2. News of a buy order decreases dealers' estimates of the conditional vari-
ance of the exchange rate.
3.
(11) ,.1/2, or a
l/2-q + q
2
A similar result holds for news of a sell order.
To understand what drives this result, examine figure 3.3 above. Panel b of the
figure shows the total increase in expected profits associated with a buy order,
H(qb) — H(q). One may easily demonstrate that qb^ q and qs ^ q. In the case
depicted, the initial unconditional probability q equals q0, while qb > q0 >
1/2. The fact that H(q) is quadratic and has a minimum at 1/2 immediately
implies that U.(qb) - Yl(q) > 0; that is, information of a buy order implies
higher expected profits. On the other hand, since in the diagram U.(qs) < H(q),
it follows that news of a sale lowers expected profits.
Why does more information in the latter case lead to lower expected profits?
The reason is as follows. One may show that the variance of the binomially
distributed random variable, z, equals 4q(l — q) and that this has a maximum
at q = 111. Thus, any information that implies a filtered, updated probability,
qu, that lies closer to 1/2 than the original unconditional q also implies a in-
crease in variance.
5
But higher variance lowers the dealer's expected profits for the reason that
the profit function (see eqq. [2] and [3]) is made up of kinked functions of the
underlying payoff, z. In this respect, the dealer's profits resemble a short posi-
tion in call and put options. Such claims are concave in the random payoff, so,
by Jensen's inequality, adding uncertainty lowers expected value.
The pure news value of information in our model takes the simple form
(12) pure news value = (1%,) - U(q)) - (U(qb)
- H(sA(q\ sB{q)\qb)) = j^ (qb ~ <?)•
This immediately implies the following result:
5. Readers more familiar with normal filtering problems may find this slightly surprising as
updating, in that case, reduces uncertainty. In the present context, for certain values of q, updating
actually increases the conditional variance.83 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
Proposition 2. When buy and sell orders are equally probable, the pure
news value of information is zero, and the feedback rent associated with
information equals the change in expected profits.
In other words, when q = 1/2, the pure news value is zero. To see the intuition
behind this finding, suppose that the dealer cannot adjust his quotes in response
to the information. Recall that the only three possible events are a buy order, a
sell order, and no trade. If there is no trade, the dealer still has H(q). When q =
1/2, the problem is completely symmetric, and, hence, information of either a
bid or an ask order must change expected profits by the same amount. But, if
all news has the same effect on expected value, it must be that the effect is
zero. Hence, the only possible increase in value from the news must come from
the dealer's ability to adjust his quotes conditional on information. That is, the
increase in total value equals the feedback rent.
3.2.2 Bid-Ask Spreads
In this section, we show that the ask of a dynamically optimizing dealer is
greater than that of a static dealer. Since, when n is large, dealers in a central-
ized market behave as though they are static, profit maximizers, this statement
may be regarded as a statement about the behavior of dealer prices in central-
ized versus decentralized markets. We state the result formally as follows:
Proposition 3. The optimal period 0 ask of a dynamically optimizing dealer
in the decentralized market exceeds that of a static solution. A corresponding
result holds for decentralized market bids that exceed static bids in abso-
lute magnitude.
By increasing the bid-ask spread from its static level, marketmakers sacrifice
short-term expected profits. On the other hand, however, they improve the
quality of the information that they derive from period 0 trades since unin-
formed trades are discouraged from transacting. Using the improved informa-
tion, dealers can earn higher expected profits in subsequent trading.
Corollary 1. As n —> °°, the bid-ask spread is wider in a decentralized than
in a centralized market.
3.2.3 Efficiency
In this section, we compare the efficiency of centralized and decentralized
markets. It should be apparent that the two market organizations each have
advantages and disadvantages. In a centralized market, dealers observe all pe-
riod 0 customer trades so that they can always update their subjective probabil-
ity assessments and correspondingly adjust their period 2 bid and ask.
On the other hand, in a centralized market, the incentives of dealers to adjust
their period 0 bid and ask so as to elicit an efficient amount of information are
diluted. In the limit, as the number of dealers n —> °°, individual dealers in a
centralized market will set sAQ and sBQ in a way that totally ignores the informa-84 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
tional rents associated with period 0 trading. In other words, they will act as
though they are static profit maximizers.
In a decentralized market, the opportunity to sell information improves in-
centives to elicit information by optimal adjustment of the bid-ask spread. In
the limit, when k — 1 and dealers can transact with all other marketmakers,
the entire market feedback rent associated with a period 0 customer order is
captured by the dealer who receives the order. In this case, marketmakers will
optimally adjust their spreads to elicit information, and hence the decentralized
market will be private efficient from the dealers' collective point of view.
However, if dealers can transact with only a fraction of other marketmakers,
the advantage of better incentives will be reduced as it will then not be possible
to capture the feedback rent associated with information. In addition, the de-
centralized market will suffer from the fact that dealers who do not receive
interdealer trades will be unable to update their probabilities in response to
period 0 order flow.
To analyze this trade-off formally, we start with the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The unconditional expectation of period 2 profits is greater when
dealers are able to update probabilities on the basis of observation of period
0 order flow.
Lemma 1 demonstrates that the ability to adjust quotes in response to informa-
tion on customer trades in period 0 increases the unconditional expectation of
period 2 profits. Using this lemma, one may prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If dealers are able to transact with all other marketmakers
in the interval between customer trades, that is, ifk— I, a decentralized
market is fully efficient. Ifk is small, however, total expected dealer profits
are higher in a centralized than a decentralized market.
In the remainder of the paper, we shall assume for simplicity that k = 1.
3.2.4 Market Crashes
A point stressed by Glosten and Milgrom in their classic 1985 paper on
dealer behavior was that markets with too many informed traders may collapse
as dealers will be unable to make positive profits given the adverse selection
problems that they face. Such market crashes will involve collapses in volume
as bid-ask spreads increase until the market closes. Note that it is possible for
the market to close on one or both sides of the bid-ask spread. Crashes are
costly because they undermine the informativeness of prices.
In our discussion of the static model in section 3.1, we have already implic-
itly considered such market collapses by discussing cases in which optimal ask
and bid prices equal, respectively, plus and minus unity. Let us suppose, as
seems reasonable, the following:
Assumption 2. If sA = 1, informed traders never buy, while, if sB = 1,
informed traders never sell.85 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
Of course, in these cases, informed customers will be indifferent between trad-
ing and not trading, but any slight friction would be enough to make them
strongly prefer not to trade.
The expressions for ask and bid prices in the static model, sA = min{g/(l —
a), 1} and sB = max{ —(1 — q)l{\ — a), — 1}, immediately suggest under what
conditions markets with static dealers will collapse. For any given q, if a is
large enough, sA = 1, and sB — — 1. On the other hand, for any given a, if q —>
1, eventually, sA = 1, while, if g —> 0, eventually, sB = 1.
Notice from the discussion in the last paragraph that there are two reasons
why the static market may collapse, either (i) too many informed traders (a
large for q around 1/2) or (ii) too little uncertainty about the value of the ex-
change rate (q close to zero or unity). These two reasons lead to qualitatively
different outcomes in that in the first both sides of the market close while in
the second only one side of the market crashes.
Figure 3.4a illustrates the way in which in the static model, for a given a,
different assumptions on q may generate crashes. In the case illustrated (in
which a > 1/2), for a < q < (1 — a), the market crashes on both sides, and
expected profits are zero. For q > a, the market crashes only on the ask side,
while, for q < (1 - a), it crashes only on the bid.
One of the most interesting implications of our model is the following:
Proposition 5. The decentralized market never collapses in period 0.
The interest of this result is that it suggests that decentralized markets are sig-
nificantly more robust to the asymmetric information problems that provoke
collapses in the static model. Recall that, as n —> °°, dealers in centralized
markets behave like static profit maximizers, so once again this sheds light on
the differences between centralized and decentralized market arrangements.
A B
Fig. 3.4 Market crashes and information86 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
The intuition behind proposition 5 is that in a decentralized market dealers
have an incentive to provide a small but sufficient incentive for informed trad-
ers to transact and hence reveal their information. Given our assumptions about
the price elasticity of orders by uninformed traders, if sAQ = 1 — e or sB0 — — 1
+ e for small, positive e, dealers can obtain very good information in the event
of a buy or sell order, respectively. As long as there is some rent to be extracted
from this information in the form of higher period 2 profits, dealers will always
have an incentive to open the market by adjusting their quotes enough to elicit
trades from informed customers.
The above proposition is illustrated by figure 3.4b, which shows expected
ask-side profits in the static and dynamic models as a function of the period 0
quote. The static expected profits equal zero at sA0 — 1, and unity is clearly the
maximizing argument. The dynamic expected profits, which appear as a dotted
line in the figure, are positive and increasing for ask quotes in an open interval
below 1 and then, in fact, drop to zero at 1. The fact that they are positive for
sA0 — 1 — e for small, positive e is what gives the above result.
3.2.5 Martingale Properties and Volatility
A feature of standard market microstructure models with competitive mar-
ketmakers (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; and Easley and O'Hara 1987)
is that bid and ask prices are martingales with respect to the information avail-
able to dealers. In this section, we shall see that, in our decentralized market
model, this is no longer the case and that, in fact, bid and ask prices exhibit
mean reversion as information is revealed.
Assumption 3. Suppose that interior solutions exist for the static model in
period 0, that is, that a < q < 1 — a.
First, consider the unconditional expectation of the difference between ask
prices in periods 0 and 2.
Proposition 6. In the static model,
(13) E[sA2 - sJS ] = 0, E[sB2 - sB0\S] = 0,
while, in the dynamic model,
(14) E[sA2 - sJD] < 0, E[sB2 - sJD] > 0.
This proposition shows that weak-form market efficiency does not hold in
our dynamic decentralized market while, in a centralized market with a large
number of dealers, bids and asks will be martingales with respect to mar-
ketmakers' information. The basic feature of the model that permits deviations
from martingale behavior is the market power that we assume for dealers.
O'Hara (1994) comments on the fact that monopolistic elements can give
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Decentralized and centralized markets also differ in the amount of volatility
that they imply. One may show that the unconditional variance of changes in
bid and ask is greater in the decentralized case.
Proposition 7. The unconditional variance of quote changes is greater in
the dynamic than in the static case, that is,
(15) Var(5A2 - sJS) < Var(^2 - sJD),
(16) Var(sB2 - sB0\S) < Var(sfi2 - sJD).
3.2.6 Comparative Statics
Proposition 3 simply states that the bid-ask spread is larger in a decentral-
ized than in a centralized market, without solving for the values taken by the
bid and ask quotes. Although exact solutions for these quotes can be found,
they are so complex that little more can be deduced. One may still, however,
analyze the first-order condition of the maximization problem to learn more
about these solutions.
Proposition 8. Let s*M be an internal optimum for the ask price. Then the
following results hold:
(17) ^>0, ^>0, fora<q.
dq da
As a first result, proposition 8 shows that the ask price always increases when
the probability of the event {z = 1} rises. Furthermore, an increase in the
proportion of informed traders produces a rise in the ask. The reasons for these
results are two: first, the need for protection against the informed traders is
stronger; second, there is an incentive to increase the size of the bid-ask spread
because with more informed traders it is possible to get more information.
Proposition 9. Suppose that a<q<l— a<qb and that the quotes chosen
by the dealer are internal optima. Then the following results hold:
(18) ^ < 0,
dq
(19) ^ > 0.
da
The result on drent/dq is interesting as it indicates that, for given a, when there
is less uncertainty (q further from 1/2), there is less ex ante information in the
order flow, that is, less opportunity to sell information.
3.2.7 Interdealer Market Volume
When a marketmaker has received some information, we assume that he can
sell it in the second period to all the remaining marketmakers. He accom-
plishes this by transacting on favorable terms through the interdealer market.88 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
We suppose that marketmakers will quote other dealers a bid-ask spread that
(i) is "regret free" according to the definition of Glosten and Milgron, in that
after a transaction marketmakers do not regret having completed it, (ii) trans-
fers feedback rent to the informed marketmaker, (iii) creates no incentives for
uninformed marketmakers to pretend to possess information, and (iv) mini-
mizes the quantity transacted.
The last property requires some comment. A given rent can be transferred
between dealers by various combinations of price and quantity. In this sense,
the prices quoted between dealers are indeterminate. However, point iv implies
unique interdealer quotes since, if the transaction size is reduced too far and
the spread made too generous, eventually uninformed dealers will be able to
make profits masquerading as informed. Assuming that the size of trades is
reduced to a minimum implies that the incentive constraint implicit in point iii
must hold as an equality and hence determines interdealer quotes.
Now, suppose that marketmaker 1 has received a buy order at time 0 (the
same reasoning applies for a sell order) and wants to sell the information to
marketmaker 2. As he is willing to buy the currency and his expected value of
the currency is 2qb — 1, marketmaker 2 will quote an ask price in the interval
(2q — 1, 2qb — 1), and a transaction will be completed for a quantity AJC
that conveys the rent of a buy order to marketmaker 1 (subject to the assumed
properties of interdealer trade (points i-iv above). Proposition 10 reports an
interesting result concerning this value:
Proposition 10. Let us define Ax* as the minimum quantity transacted
among two marketmakers. Suppose that the regularity conditions of proposi-
tion 9 are satisfied. The following result holds:
(20) 0.
da
The proposition simply indicates that, given these conditions, the volume of
transactions between marketmakers is indicative of the informativeness of the
order flow as the minimum quantity transacted among two marketmakers is an
increasing function of a.
3.3 Conclusion
This paper has provided a theoretical analysis of a decentralized dealer mar-
ket. Although our results are relevant to a broad category of markets in which
order flow information is not publicly available the primary motivation for our
study was the desire to understand price formation and efficiency in the foreign
exchange market. Our main findings are the following:
1. Bid ask spreads are wider in the decentralized market. The intuition here
is that, by posting wider spreads, dealers can discourage price-sensitive liquid-89 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
ity traders and hence improve the informativeness of their order flow. The in-
formation embodied in orders can in turn be used to earn higher future profits
and can be "sold" to other marketmakers through interbank transactions at
advantageous prices.
2. Decentralized markets are privately efficient from the collective point of
view of marketmakers when it is possible for dealers to transact with all other
dealers in between potentially informative customer trades. This point under-
lines the potential importance of brokers as a way of facilitating large numbers
of simultaneous transactions with other marketmakers.
3. Decentralized markets are much less subject to market crashes than cen-
tralized markets. Information on order flow may be used to update subjective
estimates of the underlying value of exchange rates. Even in circumstances in
which static or centralized markets would crash owing to excessive numbers
of informed traders, dealers will have an incentive to preserve some turnover
in the decentralized market as they can employ the information in the order
flow in subsequent trading. Our model allows only two periods of trading with
customers, but we would conjecture that our results on crashes would hold in
a multiperiod model, in that dealers would always have an incentive to preserve
at least some order flow to gain information.
4. The time-series behavior of exchange rates in our model differs ac-
cording to whether trading is organized on a centralized or a decentralized
basis. When dealers maximize profits in a static fashion (which they will do in
a centralized market containing large numbers of marketmakers), bid and ask
quotes are martingales with respect to the information available to dealers. In
the decentralized market, bid-ask spreads on average shrink as order flow re-
veals information.
It is very interesting to note that this implication of the model is consistent
with the findings of Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991). Their study suggests that,
prior to jumps in exchange rates, there is an increase in the negative autocorre-
lation. If we regard jump times as moments at which significant information
becomes public knowledge (i.e., corresponding to our period 3), then our
model would suggest that, in the immediately preceding period, a small num-
ber of agents will know the information and dealers will be adjusting quotes
so that the bid-ask spread is contracting on average.
5. Another implication of the model for the statistical properties of ex-
change rates is that changes in rates will be more variable in the decentralized
than in the centralized market. It is perhaps not clear quite what is the quantita-
tive significance of this difference in variance, but, given the widely acknowl-
edged volatility of exchange rates, it is at least reassuring that our model pre-
dicts greater variance in decentralized markets.90 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
Appendix
Proofs are stated for the ask side of the market throughout. Similar arguments
apply to the bid side.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. The following three statements are equivalent:
1. News of a buy order increases total expected profits in period 2.
2. News of a buy order decreases dealers' estimates of the conditional vari-
ance of the exchange rate.
3.
,™ >,n ^ (1/2 - q){\ - q)
(21) q ^ 1/2, or a > — .
1/2 - q + q
2
A similar result holds for news of a sell order.
Proof. The equivalence of the first two statements is obvious; in fact, as
H(sA(q), sB(q)) is symmetric around 1/2, we have a gain in the expected profits
from a buy order if qb — 1/2 > 1/2 — q; that corresponds to a reduction in
the conditional variance of the exchange rate. Moreover, qb — 1/2 > 1/2 — q
holds if
(22) aq
2 + (1 - a)(l - sj(q - 1/2) > 0.
Then, for sA0 — q{\ — a), this condition becomes
aq
2 > (1 - a - q)(l/2 - q).
It is immediately obvious that this condition holds for the values of a and q
respecting the condition (21). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. The optimal period 0 ask of a dynamically optimizing dealer
in the decentralized market exceeds that of the static solution. A correspond-
ing result holds for decentralized market bids that exceed static bids in abso-
lute magnitude.
Proof. Let V'o be that part of the dynamic value function that depends on the
ask price, sA0, multiplied by the constant n. V'o equals







-\\in- l)Prob(A) + *-^ (1 - a)] U2(sA2, sB2).
Assuming that a < 1/2, and given the different form of the static value function
for different configurations of q and a, we consider six cases: q < qb < a;91 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
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= q - (1 - a)sA0 + T = 0.
We show that in all cases F is positive and therefore
(25) 5*0 ^ the static solution.
In particular, we show that in the first five cases
(26) s* > = the static solution,
1 — a
while in the last case the static and the dynamic solutions are both equal to
one.
Case 1. q < qb < a. The components of F are as follows:
n-v 1 - a , [(1 - a) - qf









It then follows that
a5A0 2Prob(A)
aProb(A)_ 1-
02) r - 4
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a Prob(A) U(._ (1 ~ qb)qb _ <*
2 + 0 ~ <*)
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This is positive as qb > q and a > q.
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That is positive as qb > a and a > q.
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Case 5. a < q < 1 - a ^ #fc. We have that
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(47) ^W ^
This implies that
(48) r . {2g»(g» ~q) + [(1 ~ a) ~
4
But, since qb > 1 - a > q, it follows that q\ > -(1 - a)[2q - (1 - a)]. So
F > 0 as required. Finally, consider the last case:
Case 6. q > 1 — a so that qb > 1 — a. Here we have








_ [2qb(qb ~q) + q
2- qj] _ [qb ~ qf
Q
4
This completes the proof.
Proof of Efficiency Results
Lemma 1. The unconditional expectation of period 2 profits is greater when
dealers are able to update probabilities on the basis of observation of period
0 order flow.
Proof. Define EIIU as the unconditional expectation of period 2 profits when
probabilities are updated at 1 after the observation of a trade should one occur:
EI1U = Prob(buy) ImaxiA2 Sm U(sM, sB21 qb)\
(53) + Prob(sell) [max^ MR U(SA2, SB2 \
+ [1 - Prob(buy) - Prob(sell)] [max^ ^ U(sA2, sB2 \
The unconditional expectation of profits without updating is denoted Ell. By
the iterative property of conditional expectations, this can be expressed in the
following way:94 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
En = maxs s Prob(buy) n(^2, sB21 qb)
(54) + Prob(sell) U(sA2, sB2 \ qs)
+ [1 - Prob(buy) - Prob(sell)] U(sA2, sB21 q)] .
It is then clear that EnM > En for Prob(buy) + Prob(sell) > O.Q
Proposition 4. If dealers are able to transact with all other marketmakers
in the interval between customer trades, that is, ifk— I, a decentralized
market is fully efficient. Ifk is small, however, total expected dealer profits
are higher in a centralized than a decentralized market.
Proof. Follows from lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. The decentralized market never collapses in period 0.
Proof. We can prove this statement in two steps. In the first, we prove that the
market cannot be always completely closed in period 2 and at least on one side
in period 0. In the second, we prove that, if the market is open at least on one
side in the second period, it cannot be closed on either side in period 0.
Step 1. Suppose that the marketmaker's strategy implies that the market is
always closed in period 2 and is closed on the sell side in period 0; we show
there exists another strategy that dominates it. Suppose that we fix in period 0
sA0 — 1 and sB0 = — 1 + e, for e > 0 and small. Suppose that a dealer will set
$42 =1/2 and sB2 = — 1 if he receives a sell order and sA2 = 1 and sB2 —
— 1 otherwise. As the sell order in period 0 for a given dealer will occur with
probability a( 1 — q)ln, and as the bid-ask spread will have a negligible effect
on period 0 profits, the total expected profits will be (1 — a)(l — sA2)(l + sA2)l
2 = 3(1 — a)/8; this implies that the second strategy dominates the first one.
A similar argument works for the ask side.
Step 2. Suppose that the ask side is closed in period 0. Lowering sA0 slightly
hardly affects period 0 expected profits but means that, in the event of a buy
order, the dealer receiving it knows almost surely that z — 1. The profit func-
tion with the ask side closed in period 0 is
(55) VQ(sA0, sB0) = V0(l, sB0) = ± {no(sj + P(B)U2(sB0)
+ (1 - P(B))U2(sA2, 5
With sA0 = 1 — e, we have
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(57) U2(sA01 SM= ie) = n2(<?|,= 1) > U2(q) = U2(sA2, sB2) .
Therefore, the ask side of the market will not be always closed in period 2; a
similar argument holds for the bid side. This completes the proof. []]
Statistics of Quote Changes
Proposition 6. In the static model,
(58) E[sA2 - sJS] = 0, E[sB2 - sJS] = 0,
while, in the dynamic model,
(59) E[sA2 - sJD] = 0, E[sB2 - sB0\D] > 0 .
Proof. In the dynamic model, we can write the difference in expectations as:
Y^- - sAOj + Prob(buy) [Y^U ~
 s*o)
(60) + Prob(no trade) (
 q - sA0)
\1 — a /
lO<0,
1 - a
where we use the fact that Prob(sell)(^J — q) = — Prob(buy)(gfo — q) and sA0
Proposition 7. The unconditional variance of quote changes is greater in
the dynamic than in the static case, that is,
- sJS) < Var(^2 - sJD),
Var(sfi2 - sJS) < Var(5fi2 - sB0\D).
Proof. Consider volatility with the two sets of quote-setting behavior. In both
static and dynamic cases,
(61) Vai(sA2 - sj = Prob(sell) [f^l + Prob(buy)
LI j
fl Prob(buy) [f
I - aj Ll - a
= [(*<?(! ~ q)V I 1 + 1 \
L 1 - a J \Prob(buy) Prob(sell)/ '96 William Perraudin and Paolo Vitale
The result then follows from the fact that Prob(buy) and Prob(sell) are larger
in the static than in the dynamic caseQ
Proof of Comparative Statics
Proposition 8. Let s*0 be an internal optimum for the ask price. Then the
following results hold:
(62) ^>0, ^>0, fora<4.
dq da
Proof. We can use the first-order condition to study the effect of a change in
any parameter of the model, 0, on s*0, as the second-order condition guarantees
that we still have an internal solution; therefore we consider
(63)
Now, as from the second-order condition it follows that d
2V'/ds*/Q < 0, the sign
of the derivative of s*A0 with respect to P corresponds to that of the numerator.
Hence, consider d
2V'/dqds*A0, which is equal to 1 + dT/dq. To prove that this
is always positive, we have to consider five of the six cases discussed in propo-
sition 2 because for q > 1 — a we do not have an internal optimum. It is easy
to show that
(64) d(fffa - q) = q(l - q - qb),
dq A
where A = aq + (1 - a)(l - sA0)/2; for q + qb > 1, as 1 - qb > 0 and A >
ag this derivative is negative but larger than — 1; while, for q + qb < 1, this
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(68)



























b - (1 - a)}/2 > 1.
?
this case, we have that
~
q)>o
For a < q and qb < 1 — a, we have to discuss only case 4; we can easily prove
that sA0 + dI7da is positive. In fact, we have
(71) f = ^-«)f>0.
da da
Proposition 9. Suppose that a<q<l—a<qb and that the quotes chosen







Proof. We assume that a is such that a<q<qb<l— a so that we concen-
trate on case 4. The rent from a buy order is given by
(72) rent(buy) = '"
— a
In case 4, q + qb > 1 so that d(qb — q)ldq is negative. This is sufficient to
prove that drent(buy)/dg is negative. Conversely, as dqjda > 0, it is immedi-
ately obvious that drent(buy)/da is positive. •
Proof of Gearing Effect Results
Proposition 10. Let us define Ax* as the minimum quantity transacted
among two marketmakers. Suppose that the regularity conditions of proposi-
tion 9 are satisfied. The following result holds:
Proof. We assume that a is such that a<q<qb<l—aso that we concen-






We know that the rent of a buy order is given in case 4 by
(74) rent(buy) = ^





Therefore, as dqjda > 0, it follows that dAx*/da > 0. This completes the
proof. •
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Comment Silverio Foresi
Perraudin and Vitale's paper explores the implications for equilibrium prices
of a multidealer market in which dealers cannot see each other's order flow.
Their main result is that a decentralized market dealers' market is less prone
to market crashes than a centralized market. Given its policy implications, this
result is very important and deserves closer scrutiny.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that the market closes down if the spe-
cialist needs to post too wide a spread to break even when the informational
asymmetry is too severe: the dealer prefers not to trade rather than trading at a
disadvantage with an informed customer. The failure to trade is an externality
on future trades that is not accounted for by the dealer. So Glosten and Mil-
grom (1985) go on to conjecture that a Pareto improvement would result from
a dealer who could retain some monopoly power.
Perraudin and Vitale propose an interesting mechanism that may give deal-
ers incentives to trade even when they face severe informational asymmetries.
If dealers can share information with each other, and, more important, if they
can agree to act as a monopolist before trades start, they can extract the surplus
from liquidity traders, and, by appropriating this rent, they have an incentive
not to let the market break down. The possibility that dealers could learn from
other dealers' quotes is quite appealing. (It was probably first presented for-
mally by Garbade, Pomrenze, and Silber [1979], who tested it in the market
for U.S. Treasury securities.)
The main elements of the model are as follows. There are three classes of
traders: informed, uninformed, and marketmakers or dealers. Everybody
knows that the value of the underlying is S = 1 with probability q and S = — 1
with probability (1 — q). The informed traders know the realization of 5 before
the first round of trades starts. Everybody else learns about it after the last
round of trade. The model features three trading periods: in the intermediate
trading period, dealers trade among themselves, sharing the information they
(may have) received in the first round of trading in order to trade again in the
last round of trades.
Uninformed trades are (1 - a)/a as numerous as informed traders. Interest-
ingly, their net demands are sensitive to prices. This is crucial because dealers
choose prices to maximize their profit from trading with uninformed traders
Silverio Foresi is visiting associate professor of finance at Columbia University and assistant
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in a manner similar to a monopolist choosing quantities taking as given the
demand function,
max sQ(s);
formally, because of the price sensitivity of the net demand, the static profit
becomes quadratic in the quoted bid (ask) prices. The price sensitivity of the
demand of uninformed traders delivers the concavity of the profit function in
the price s and its convexity in the probability of high outcomes q.
It is not immediately obvious how to justify the assumption that informed
dealers can appropriate the rent by trading with uninformed dealers in period
1. The issue is related to the question, Why aren't quotes in period 1 fully
revealing? In standard models with noise that is because noise trade provides
camouflage to informed traders. But there are only dealers trading in period 1.
What provides camouflage to the "informed dealer" in period 1? Since the
uninformed dealer cannot see the informed dealer trade, he must learn from
other dealers' quotes and possible trades with the informed ones. Assume that
dealers do not act strategically. If dealer A, who saw no customer in period 0,
calls dealer B in period 1, she learns from the quote whether A saw a sell, a
buy, or nothing. But, having seen the quote, she does not need to trade. But
why would informed dealers want to post bid-ask prices that reveal any infor-
mation? There are two effects at play here. On the one hand, if information is
better diffused, all dealers may agree to narrow their spread in period 2. This
increases liquidity trades and presumably dealers' profits. On the other hand,
larger liquidity volumes provide additional camouflage to informed traders.
This reduces dealers' profits. It is unclear whether the balance of the two
effects is positive.
While the rent-sharing rule assumed in the paper is not essential, it is essen-
tial to show that some rule is viable. Consider the following story, which may
justify the assumption in the paper that 100 percent of the rent is captured by
the informed dealers. Only dealers who did not see a trade need to get informa-
tion; let us assume that they call around to all other dealers and ask to trade,
giving their (uninformed) bid-ask spread. If the called dealer is informed, there
is a trade, and they get information. If the called dealer is uninformed, there is
no trade. At this point, however, there are two types of dealers: the ex-
uninformed, who have learned all the trades, and the ex-informed, who know
only their period 0 trade. In a second round of interdealer trade, the ex-
informed dealers may all call each other to share information or trade with one
of the ex-uninformed dealers. While complicated, this story is appealing for
two reasons. First, the information is transferred credibly. Second, period 1
volume may far exceed period 0 volume, which agrees with the observation
that a large volume of trade is not customer driven.
This rent-sharing mechanism also justifies the hypothesis that there is trade
in period 1, as assumed in the paper. The interdealers' period 1 trades are
otherwise not essential for the main result of the paper. If we did not have101 Interdealer Trade and Information Flows
period 1 trades, there would be four types of traders in period 2: uninformed
and informed traders and uninformed and informed dealers. Dealers do not
know ex ante whether they will be informed or uninformed. However, since
they are risk neutral, they will leave the market open in period 0 more often
than competitive marketmakers in a centralized market, provided again that
they agree to act collusively.
The previous discussion shows that the main result of the paper hinges on
dealers' collusion. I now look at how the collusion is achieved a bit more
closely. The model is designed to mimic a market like the foreign exchange
market in which there is no consolidated information on the order flow. No-
body knows whether other trades were executed at bid or ask prices, if at all.
The model assumes, however, that customers are served at random. This cuts
off the feedback from prices to demand and ensures that there is no incentive
to deviate from the dealers' cartel in period 0. It is realistic, however, that
liquidity traders see the quotes posted by all dealers and prefer to trade at the
narrower bid-ask spread. In this case, a dealer has an incentive to post a bid-
ask spread just a bit narrower than her competitors to monopolize information,
and in so doing she will break the cartel.
The assumption that makes the cartel self-sustaining in the model of Perrau-
din and Vitale is that dealers cannot attract more customers by offering better
prices: the probability of serving a customer is fixed and equal to (1/n). But
this assumption is too strong for a market like the foreign exchange market,
where there is consolidated information on quotes.
Dealers' markets offer services that auction markets cannot offer, such as
the certainty of execution of trade, which may be essential to liquidity traders
in the foreign exchange market. These are services that make dealers' markets
undoubtedly desirable. This paper contains a different argument for the desir-
ability of a decentralized dealers' system: a dealers' market is less prone to
market crashes than a centralized one.
I have argued, however, that the result does not depend on information shar-
ing. It is essential that dealers agree to collude and act as a monopolist. It is
reasonable that in a dealers' market with a small number of players it is easier
to collude and agree on rent-sharing rules. But, if we are ready to trade off
the market's robustness for liquidity traders' happiness, why not have a single
monopolist dealer? A monopolist dealer may be better than a cartel of dealers
if there are any costs in monitoring the coalition and sharing the rent.
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Comment Alan Kirman
This paper is a particularly interesting contribution since it attempts to model
certain specific aspects of the microstructure of the foreign exchange market
and to explain a particular phenomenon, the large amount of interdealer trad-
ing. Many papers on this subject either simply describe the functioning of the
market, which is, of course, interesting in itself, or build macro models in
which allusion is made to certain features of the microstructure. The latter are
thus used to justify rather than to analyze the macroeconomic characteristics.
The main line of the early theoretical literature that did analyze the micro-
structure and that can be identified with Garman (1976) concentrated on how
marketmakers would adjust inventories and bid-ask spreads in response to a
stream of orders. Later, the problem of asymmetric information became the
dominant concern (see, e.g., Hsieh and Kleidon, chap. 2 in this volume), and
the current paper fits in this category.
In the first part of this comment, I make some specific remarks about the
model developed by the authors and in the second suggest other potential mod-
eling strategies to capture the phenomenon in which they are interested.
The authors' model can be thought of as one in which bookmakers are faced
with a two-horse race. There are a number of experts around who know which
horse will win, and the bookmakers know how many of these there are, but not
their identity, and have a prior probability as to which horse will win and give
odds as a function of this. In the first stage, a bettor arrives and places a bet on
one of the horses. This event provides information for the bookmaker, who can
adjust his odds, and, since odds are not posted, he can pass this information on
to his fellow bookmakers at a price. Thus, a transaction will occur between
bookmakers. Bookmakers can now accept further bets from customers, if any
are forthcoming. The race is then run, and the whole procedure starts again for
the next race. The obvious objection here, and one to which I come back later,
is that in the foreign exchange market the "race" is never run, although one
could assimilate it to the arrival of some news about which people had prior
ideas.
Interdealer trading in the model permits the flow of information about cus-
tomer orders. The fixed horizon keeps the analysis tractable. Leaving this on
one side for a moment, two features are striking. First, the position that a dealer
holds does not enter into the analysis. It is, of course, often said that many
traders, as in this model, do not trade off their positions, but this cannot hold
all the time if, as in reality, they are constrained to be in a zero net position at
the end of the trading day. One should therefore stick to the authors' interpreta-
tion that they are dealing with a very short interval of time, but one that cannot
be too near the close of the market.
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Second, the probability with which liquidity traders act does not depend on
q, which I take to be common knowledge. (In the model, the realization of the
exchange rate is a random variable z that takes on the values 1 and — 1 with
probabilities q and [1 — q].) Indeed, the first customer, however misinformed,
could infer the prior q from the bid and ask that he is offered. One would have
expected there to be some sensitivity to the probability q in the reaction of
liquidity traders.
In the model, one dealer receives a trade, and he captures the rent from that
trade by doing the smallest transaction size and charging the appropriate price
to exact the rent from the purchaser. The relation between the potential profit
to be made from receiving a customer and the number of traders is interesting.
While it seems reasonable that with a small number of dealers only one would
receive a customer in some short period of time, it would seem that as the
number of firms rose the number of customers arriving would rise also and
therefore that both the probability and the profitability of such an encounter
would change.
Finally, in the context of this model, agents trade only with each other once
an order has been received from an outside customer, but this need not be the
case in general. Furthermore, the bids and asks that a new customer faces in
period 2, that is, after interdealer trades have taken place, will depend on
whether the dealer he meets has just been engaged in such trades. Thus, the
sequence of prices will be influenced by this and the properties of the price
series further complicated.
Incidentally, while the properties of the stochastic price process are of theo-
retical interest, they are difficult to test precisely because transactions data are
not generally available.
To turn now to alternative approaches, the most obvious of these is to sug-
gest that dealers holding open positions are aware that they will have to close
them by the end of the day in general and will therefore adjust their bids and
asks accordingly. This would suggest that an approach based on risk sharing
and inventory management (see Lyons 1995) might be appropriate. This is
what is suggested by Suvanto (1993) when he says, "Transactions the dealer
undertakes in the role of a customer with a market maker are called cover
transactions^ He also says, "The motive for this kind of transaction, in general,
is position adjustment, not trading income as such." Two things feature here:
one is the position adjustment because of risk, and the other is adjustment to
close the position as the end of day horizon approaches. The horizon problem
is thus different from that in Perraudin and Vitale's model and is linked no
longer to the arrival of some realization of a random variable but rather to the
closing of the market. As I suggested earlier, the "race" in my analogy to their
model is never actually run, and for this reason the other sort of horizon seems
more plausible.
Another problem is that of where information comes from. In reality, a for-
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screens full of indicative quotes, and he hears the quotes of brokers through
loudspeakers as well as observing the electronic broking system. Now, it can
be argued that the indicative quotes do not reflect transaction prices clearly,
that an actual trade conveys much more information, and that this will change
behavior and resultant prices. The difficulty with this is that, having thus ob-
tained theoretical results concerning the characteristics of prices derived from
a model of information-generating transactions, it is very difficult to test them
since most of the data available correspond to indicative quotes, not to transac-
tion prices.
Another observation is that interdealer trading may simply be due to differ-
ent expectations (see, e.g., Frankel and Froot 1990), which may not be irratio-
nal (see, e.g., Kurz 1994) or which may involve agents learning (see Lewis
1989a, 1989b).
A last way of looking at exchange rate evolution is as a process in which
dealers infer from or are influenced by the actions of others, which leads to
"herd behavior" (see, e.g., Banerjee 1992; Kirman 1993; and Sharfstein and
Stein 1990) or to "informational cascades" (see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch 1992). Indeed, one can interpret Perraudin and Vitale's contribution as
a special case of this type of model, in which one piece of information is
passed along sequentially to other dealers.
However, in fact what seems to be important is that numbers of dealers are
trading with and taking account of the trades of their usual network of partners.
How traders react will depend on a combination of their current position and
their interpretation of the information contained in a trade. In such a frame-
work the stochastic reactions of the agents may or may not generate a shift in
an exchange rate, but there is not necessarily any fundamental information
contained in trades. Thus Perraudin and Vitale view interdealer trading as in-
volving the sale and passage of information contained in orders, while an alter-
native view developed in Kirman (1995) is that interdealer trading can, of it-
self, generate exchange rate movements without any exogenous information.
In conclusion, the present paper offers an interesting contribution to the lit-
erature showing how variations in a particular structure in a model lead to
changes in the prices in that model. Whether the aspect that the authors
choose—information transmission—is the most important in explaining inter-
dealer trading is an open question, but their contribution provides a way of
making a more precise analysis of the question.
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